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Attention
Abstract

Children identified as cognitively gifted, in comparison with age-matched mainstream samples,
are advantaged in numerous areas, including mathematics, speed and efficiency in cognitive
processing, and resistance to interfering stimuli. Although working memory (WM) has been
implicated as a factor mediating these advantages, evidence suggests that gifted children may not
be advantaged in all aspects of WM function. We hypothesized that this difference is related to
the contrast between mental (related to prefrontal dopamine circuits) and perceptual attention
(likely related to prefrontal acetylcholine circuits). Specifically, it was expected that cognitively
gifted children would excel in WM tasks taxing mental but not perceptual attention. Ninety-one
children from grades 4 and 8, in the gifted and mainstream academic streams, received WM tasks
requiring primarily perceptual attention (SOPT) and mental attention (n-back), as well as
measures of mental-attentional capacity, shifting, and inhibition. Gifted children outperformed
their mainstream peers on all tasks, except SOPT (even when mental demand was matched).
Results demonstrate a necessary distinction between mental and perceptual attention in the
measurement of WM.
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Factors Underlying Cognitive Giftedness: Mental Versus Perceptual Attention
Conceptualisations of cognitive giftedness often entail an element of intellectual
precocity (e.g., intelligence significantly exceeding the average for a given chronological age), as
commonly measured by standardized intelligence tests. In fact, identification of gifted children
for subsequent inclusion in gifted education programs is often still determined, at least in part, by
performance on these standardized measures. Children identified as gifted, in comparison with
age-matched mainstream samples, are advantaged in numerous areas, including mathematics
(Hoard, Geary, Byrd-Craven, & Nugent, 2008), speed and efficiency in cognitive processing
(Johnson, Im-Bolter, & Pascual-Leone, 2003; Saccuzzo, Johnson, & Guertin, 1994), and
resistance to interfering stimuli (Johnson et al., 2003).
Working memory (WM) has been implicated as a factor mediating the demonstrated
cognitive advantages of gifted children. That is, gifted children, in addition to superior
performance on standardized intelligence tests, also tend to demonstrate an increased WM
capacity in comparison with their mainstream peers (Johnson et al., 2003; Pascual-Leone &
Johnson, 2010; Saccuzzo et al., 1994; Segalowitz, Unsal, & Dywan, 1992). This is consistent
with research showing a strong association between performance on working memory and
general ability measures in children and adults (e.g., Cowan et al., 2005; Cowan, Fristoe, Elliott,
Brunner, & Saults, 2006; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Heitz, Unsworth, & Engle, 2005;
Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Brown, & Mackintosh, 2009).
Complicating this relationship, however, is Segalowitz et al.’s (1992) finding that gifted
children outperformed their mainstream counterparts on tasks of central executive function, but
not on two visual-spatial WM tasks (for findings indicating a gifted advantage on visual-spatial
WM tasks, see Hoard et al., 2008). A possible explanation for this dissociation among WM tasks
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is suggested by the Theory of Constructive Operators (TCO) (Pascual-Leone & Goodman,
1979), in its contrast between effortless perceptual (externally-driven) attention versus effortful
mental attention - a distinction that is not readily available in contemporary WM theory. Gifted
children, thus, may be advantaged on tasks requiring primarily mental attention (the domain-free
aspects of WM or general executive strategies), but not on tasks that can be solved primarily with
perceptual attention.
Attentional Processes Subserving Working Memory: Mental Versus Perceptual Attention
Although WM processing is intrinsically variable due to the variability in modality (e.g.,
visual, auditory) and domain (e.g., spatial, quantitative) across WM tasks, neuroscientific
evidence has implicated distinct brain structures and processes consistently involved in WM.
Foremost among these are the contributions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and prefrontal
dopamine to the activation, inhibition, and coordination of cortical pathways (routinely bundled
as attentional and executive functions; Diamond, Briand, Fossella, & Gehlbach, 2004; Diamond,
Prevor, Callender, & Druin, 1997; Petrides & Milner, 1982; Wiegersma, van der Scheer, &
Hijman, 1990). Despite evidence for these common mechanisms, however, recent findings have
shown that even these domain-general components of WM are insufficient to explain the entire
range of WM function. For instance, Diamond et al. (2004) reported that whereas success on the
self-ordered pointing task (SOPT; a WM task commonly used to assess prefrontal executive
function) is reliant upon the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Diamond et al., 2004; Petrides &
Milner, 1982; Wiegersma et al., 1990), performance was unaffected by depleting prefrontal
dopamine (DA; Diamond et al., 1997, 2004; Petrides & Milner, 1982). These findings appear
particularly problematic for frameworks that envision a singular attentional mechanism
subserving WM, as the recruitment of differential brain resources across tasks that are

Attention

Mental Versus Perceptual
5

purportedly homogenous (at least insofar as they commonly engage WM) suggests the
mobilization of a discrepant set of cognitive processes toward task completion.
In resolving the inability of prefrontal DA to account for the broad range of WM
functions, the Theory of Constructive Operators (TCO) distinguishes between effortless
perceptual (externally-driven) attention and effortful mental attention – a distinction that is not
readily available in contemporary WM theory (Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 1979). The TCO
further hypothesizes that these distinct forms of attention are mediated by different
neurotransmitters according to the functional characteristics of the task (Pascual-Leone &
Johnson, 2006). Perceptual attention, believed to be mediated by the acetylcholinergic
neurotransmitter, refers to cognitive processing of external (perceptually available) information
(Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2006). In contrast, mental attention, believed to be mediated by the
dopaminergic neurotransmitter, entails the voluntary, often effortful cognitive processing of
internal (mental) information, which functions with relative autonomy from perceptual input
(Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2006). These hypotheses receive support from findings that
prefrontal functioning in strongly misleading situations (e.g., as in the n-back task) is supported
by the DA-system (Braver & Barch, 2002; Luciana, Hanson, & Whitley, 2004; Mehta, Manes,
Magnolfi, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2004; Mollion, Ventre-Dominey, Dominey, & Brousolle, 2003),
whereas facilitating situations, as in the SOPT, are thought to be supported by prefrontal
acetylcholine (ACh) (Foldi, White, & Schaefer, 2005; for a review of ACh function see Sarter &
Bruno, 1997).
Linking Mental Attention, Perceptual Attention, Working Memory, and Giftedness
Although previous evidence has shown gifted children tend to outperform their
mainstream peers on measures of WM capacity, mental-attentional (M-) capacity, and executive
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function (Johnson et al., 2003; Johnson, Pascual-Leone, Im-Bolter, & Verrilli, 2004), it is not
clear to what extent, as a group, higher gifted performance on WM and M-measures is due to
advanced capacity versus superior executive skills. This lack of clarity stems from the fact that
heightened performance on M-measures may result from a heightened M-capacity, superior
executive processes, or both, due to the concurrent requirement for activation and inhibition in
these tasks. Further sources of activation exist in WM measures (e.g., overlearning, affect),
whereby mental attention is but one of these possible sources of high activation. From this
perspective, M-capacity can be seen as the causal factor underlying developmental growth in
WM (Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2005). Further, in conjunction with learning, the maturation of
M-capacity (from one symbolic unit at 3-4 years of age to seven symbolic units at 15+ years,
increasing one unit approximately every two years) leads to increasingly complex cognition and
performance across development. In contrast, perceptual attention (controlled by the brain’s
default network) is believed to develop earlier and more rapidly than mental attention.
In the present study we sought to investigate the factors underlying cognitive giftedness
by examining the TCO’s contrast between mental and perceptual attention in gifted and
mainstream children. It was predicted that gifted children can be distinguished by a superior
executive repertoire, such that they should perform better than mainstream peers on a highexecutive-demand task requiring mental attention (i.e., n-back updating task). However, they
should not show superior performance on a lower-executive-demand task that involves primarily
perceptual attention (i.e., SOPT), even when the updating element and mental demand of the
tasks are equated. Conversely, if gifted children are found to score higher on both tasks (i.e., both
metal and perceptual attention), then M-capacity alone (which can also be used in perceptual
tasks) may be sufficient, without regard to executive repertoire, to distinguish gifted children
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from mainstream ones. On the premise that gifted children possess a sophisticated executive
repertoire, it was further hypothesized that gifted children would outperform their mainstream
peers on executive function tasks. As executive strategies can be learned, such a result would
suggest that the demonstrated advantages of gifted children are, at least in part, learned. If so,
there exists the possibility that appropriate educational initiatives could narrow the demonstrated
performance gap between gifted and mainstream students.
Method
Participants
Participants were 91 children from an elementary school in the Greater Toronto Area.
They were from grades 4 and 8 and from gifted and mainstream academic programmes. The four
groups were: grade 4 mainstream (n=22), grade 4 gifted (n=28), grade 8 mainstream (n=22), and
grade 8 gifted (n=19). Students categorized as gifted were in congregated classrooms for children
identified as gifted. Identification required a minimum achievement of 97th percentile on Boardapproved standardized intelligence or ability tests. Children categorized as mainstream in the
current study were in regular classrooms. The sample was comprised of 45 girls and 46 boys.
Age ranged from 9.28 to 14.23 years (grade 4: M=9.81, SD=0.33; grade 8: M=13.72, SD=0.31).
Measures
All computer-based measures were presented on a Dell Latitude D820 laptop computer
and were programmed in E-Prime 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Responses
to the SOPT were made via a KTMT-1700W Magic Touch add-on touch screen (Keytec Inc.,
Garland, TX) using a stylus.
Higher executive-demand measure, primarily requiring mental attention: N-back.
The n-back requires subjects to mentally update the set of relevant stimuli at the expense of those
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that are no longer task-relevant (Cohen et al., 1997; Friedman et al., 2006; Im-Bolter, Johnson, &
Pascual-Leone, 2006; Nystrom et al., 2000). Subjects must evaluate whether the currently
presented stimulus matches a stimulus presented n items earlier, which is no longer perceptually
available. It carries high executive demand and requires mobilization of mental attention. We
predicted that gifted children would score higher on updating trials.
This computer-based task had three conditions, presented in ascending order of difficulty.
Stimuli were three-dot patterns that were presented serially on a computer screen. In the 0-back
condition, subjects identified whether or not each new stimulus matched a particular 3-dot target
pattern. In the 1-back condition, they identified whether or not each new pattern matched the
immediately preceding one (i.e., 1 item back). This condition required subjects to update the
contents of WM after each presentation. The 2-back condition required subjects to match the
current pattern to the one presented two items earlier in the sequence (i.e., 2 items back). This
condition required the continual and serial updating of the two most recent patterns.
There were nine distinct three-dot patterns, presented in a semi-random order. For each
condition children received verbal training, 15 paper-based practice trials on 5x8 inch cue cards,
14 computer-based practice trials, and 54 task trials (4 non-scored preparation trials, 30 nonmatch test trials, and 20 match test trials). The paper-based practice trials were repeated a
maximum of three times, if the child did not understand the instructions (evidenced by one or
more incorrect responses). Participants indicated with a key press whether or not the current
pattern matched the target pattern (0-back) or the pattern seen one or two trials earlier. Each
stimulus was presented for 500 ms, followed by a 2500 ms gap, during which the subject could
respond. A tone signalled responses that were incorrect or made beyond the trial time limit. We
report data on the proportion of correct target identifications (i.e., match trials).
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Lower executive-demand measures, primarily requiring perceptual attention: SOPT.
The self-ordered pointing task (SOPT; originally developed by Petrides & Milner, 1982) is
a WM task of prefrontal executive function. Subjects repeatedly see the same set of stimuli
(rearranged on each trial) and must point to a new stimulus on each trial. The SOPT is
facilitating, because the relevant stimuli are always perceptually available, and it carries
minimal executive demand (i.e., little need for inhibition, shifting, or updating). We
predicted that gifted children would score equivalently to mainstream children on the
SOPT.
We used the abstract stimuli condition of the SOPT version developed by Cragg and
Nation (2007). Subjects were shown a set of abstract designs (4, 6, 8, or 10 designs) on a laptop
screen, and could select (i.e., touch) any design to begin. Upon making a selection, the next
screen appeared with the same designs in different locations. With each screen, subjects had to
select a new design, without duplicating a selection, thus attempting to select each design exactly
once. Each set was repeated three times successively, separated by a screen indicating the
“game” number, differing only in stimuli locations. The designs within the three presentations of
each set size remained constant; however, novel abstract designs were adopted for each set size.
Designs measured 43 x 43 mm and were black and white presented on a blue background (for
examples see Cragg & Nation, 2007). Task levels were presented in order of ascending set size,
with the first (4 design) level used as training. Abstract designs were chosen due to the difficulty
of encoding them verbally, thereby minimizing the possible influence of differential linguistic
ability between groups. We report data for a span score (mean number of correct touches until
the first error, not including the first touch for which an error is not possible). Results were
similar when data were analyzed in terms of accuracy (proportion correct selections).
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In order to complexify the SOPT we developed a version that required updating; we call
this the U-SOPT. The updating component was introduced in order to match the mental demand
(in terms of M-capacity) and updating requirement of the n-back, yet preserve the task’s demand
primarily for perceptual attention. Only the 4, 6, and 8 design levels were administered in the USOPT, and again, the 4-design level was used for training. In addition to selecting a new design
on each screen, subjects had to indicate their just-previous selection. For example, upon reaching
the second screen, they were required to choose a previously unselected (‘new’) design, followed
by indicating the (‘old’) selection that immediately preceded this. After subjects indicated their
selections, the stimuli would rearrange (via the experimenter’s press of the spacebar on an
external keyboard). The stimuli remained the same as for each corresponding level of the
standard SOPT. As with the SOPT, we report data on mean span until the first error of any sort
(mean number of correct screens until the first error, not including the first screen for which an
error is not possible).
M-capacity measures. The Figural Intersections Task (FIT; Pascual-Leone &
Baillargeon, 1994; Pascual-Leone & Ijaz, 1989; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2010) is a paperbased measure of M-capacity. Each item is comprised of a set of two to eight discrete shapes on
the right-hand side of the page, and the same set of shapes in an overlapping configuration on the
left-hand side (in some items there is an additional irrelevant shape, to be ignored, on the left).
Subjects must locate the one area of common intersection of the relevant overlapping shapes on
the left. Item level is defined as the number of relevant shapes to be held in mind in order to find
the intersection. Item level also corresponds to the demand of items in terms of need for Mcapacity (i.e., M-demand; Pascual-Leone & Baillargeon, 1994; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2010).
The FIT was administered in one group session for each class, with each subject
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independently completing his or her own booklet. FIT booklets consisted of 36 randomly ordered
items (ranging from difficulty levels 2 to 8). There were 5 items at each difficulty level 2 through
8, with the exception of level 4 which had 6 items. Training was provided to the group in the
context of 8 practice items. FIT M-score corresponded to the highest item level with at least 80%
of items solved correctly, provided all lower levels also reached the 80% threshold with one
lower level permitted to fall to 60%.
The Direction Following Task (DFT) is a linguistic measure of M-capacity (Agostino,
Johnson, & Pascual-Leone, 2010; Cunning, 2003; Im-Bolter et al., 2006; Pascual-Leone &
Johnson, 2010). Subjects use cut-outs that vary in shape (circle or square), colour (white, blue,
green, red, or yellow), and size (small or large) in order to carry out verbal directions of
increasing complexity. The directions require placing a cut-out onto a space on a wooden board
(i.e., “place X on Y”). Spaces vary in size and color.
The task consisted of 35 graded items (5 items at each of seven levels of complexity),
preceded by verbal training and 5 practice items. Complexity was a function of the number of
objects, spaces, and characteristics in the direction (e.g., “Place a white square on a small blue
space,” “Place a red square and a white circle on a small yellow space”). Directions referring to
two objects had to be carried out in the specified order. The shapes and board were covered while
each instruction (item) was read aloud, after which the stimuli were made available to the subject
to carry out the instruction.
The M-demand of DFT levels is a function of the number of elements within the
instruction that must be activated simultaneously with mental attention. Theoretical M-demand
estimates have been validated empirically (Cunning, 2003; Im-Bolter et al., 2006; Pascual-Leone
& Johnson, 2005, 2010). DFT M-score corresponded to the M-demand of the most complex level
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with at least 60% of items solved correctly, provided all lower levels also reached the 60%
threshold with one lower level permitted to fall to 40%. Consistent with previous findings, we
expected gifted students to score higher than mainstream students on the M-tasks.
Executive function tasks. The Contingency Naming Task (CNT) was designed by
Taylor, Albo, Phebus, Sachs, and Bierl (1987) as a cognitive flexibility measure (see also,
Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001; Anderson, Anderson, Northam, &
Taylor, 2000). It has since been used as a measure of shifting or task switching (e.g., Agostino et
al., 2010; Mazzocco & Kover, 2007). The task involves two simple naming trials, as well as a
one-dimensional and a two-dimensional shifting trial. These trials are presented in order of
increasing difficulty.
The stimulus card contained three rows of nine coloured (blue, green, and pink) shapes
(square, circle, and triangle), each enclosing an inner shape (square, circle, and triangle). Above
three of the stimuli in each row there was a backward pointing arrow. Subjects named aloud the
color or outer shape of each stimulus, based on a set of rules. In the first trial, they named the
colour of each design, and in the second trial named the outer shapes. The one-dimensional
shifting trial required them to name the color of the design when the inner and outer shapes
matched, but to name the outer shape when there was no match. The two-dimensional shifting
trial involved switching between two rules: 1) maintain the rule from the previous onedimensional switching task; but 2) reverse this rule when a backward arrow appeared above a
design. Instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy.
Before each trial condition, children were introduced to the relevant rule and practiced it
on a seven-design practice card. Practice was repeated until all seven responses were correct or a
maximum of five practice trials had been administered. For each trial condition, the tester noted
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errors and used a hand-held stopwatch to record the time taken to respond to all 27 stimuli. We
report data for an efficiency score that reflects both accuracy and speed. It is calculated by the
following formula: [(1/ time to complete the sub-task) / SQRT (errors + 1)] x 100, and a higher
score represents better ability to shift (Anderson et al., 2000).
The Antisaccade task (adapted from Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter,
2000) indexes inhibitory control (Agostino et al., 2010; Im-Bolter et al., 2006; Miyake et al.,
2000). The prepotent response in this task is to perform a saccade in the direction of a visual cue
that suddenly enters the visual field. For successful performance, however, subjects must inhibit
this saccade. While focusing on a fixation point, subjects are faced with a visual cue (a solid
black square) on one side of a computer screen, promptly followed by a target stimulus (an arrow
pointing up, right, or left inside a box) on the opposite side of the screen. They must inhibit their
reflexive saccade toward the visual cue, instead looking toward the target stimulus on the
opposite side of the screen, in order to identify the target before it is masked. Failure to inhibit
this saccade results in subjects’ being unable to accurately identify the direction the target
stimulus was pointing (indicated by pressing the ‘←’, ‘↑’, or ‘→’ key on the laptop keyboard).
The timing of stimuli presentation was as follows: a fixation cross for a variable time (1500-3500
ms); a blank screen for 50 ms; a cue for 225 ms; a target for 100 ms, followed by a mask that
remained on screen until a response was made.
Twenty-two practice trials and 90 target trials were administered. The order of stimuli
(arrow direction and left vs. right side of screen) was determined randomly for each subject.
Scores were proportion correct target identifications and latency for correct responses.
Procedure
Tasks were administered in three sessions, two individual (in a separate, quiet classroom)
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and one group (in the students’ homeroom), each about 40 minutes long. Order of task
administration was held constant as follows: Individual Session 1 – Self-Ordered Pointing Task,
Updating Self-Ordered Pointing Task, Contingency Naming Task, Direction Following Task;
Individual Session 2 – n-back, Antisaccade; and Group Session – Figural Intersections Task.
Results
Data Screening
Data first were screened for normality and sphericity. Because sphericity consistently was
violated, an adjusted degrees of freedom analysis (Greenhouse-Geisser) was conducted for all
within-subjects effects. For all task scores in which outliers were present (i.e., n-back, DFT,
antisaccade accuracy, and antisaccade latency) analyses were run with and without extreme
observations. Because the pattern of results did not differ for any variable, we retained these
observations in all reported analyses.
N-back. Due to demand for mental attention, we predicted that gifted students would
score higher than mainstream peers on updating conditions of the n-back task. We conducted a
Greenhouse-Geisser (G-G) 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) x 3 (condition) ANOVA on proportion of
correct responses on trials in which there was a match between stimulus and target (i.e., correct
target identification). There were main effects for stream, F(1, 87) = 8.81, p = .004, partial η2 = .
09; grade, F(1, 87) = 7.86, p = .006, partial η2 = .08; and n-back condition, F(1.771, 154.071) =
238.02, p < .001, partial η2 = .73. Overall, gifted students scored higher than mainstream peers,
grade 8s scored higher than grade 4s, and contrasts showed that scores decreased with each
increase in n-back level.
There were Stream x Condition, F(1.771, 154.071) = 6.16, p = .004, partial η2 = .07; and
Grade x Condition interactions, F(1.771, 154.071) = 3.84, p = .028, partial η2 = .04. These were
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conditioned by a Stream x Grade x Condition interaction, F(1.771, 154.071) = 6.46, p = .003, η2
= .07. This interaction can be understood as follows: 1) There was no gifted advantage on the
simple 0-back task; 2) gifted children in both grades showed an advantage on the moderately
difficult 1-back task; and 3) on the difficult 2-back task, there was a gifted advantage only for the
older children—indeed, mainstream grade 8s and both groups of grade 4s performed at chance
level on this task.
Self-ordered pointing task (SOPT). If giftedness in childhood is characterized by high
performance in tasks with high demand for both mental attention and executive processing, then
we would not expect a gifted advantage on a task such as SOPT, which is facilitated by
perceptual attention. We examined mean span (i.e., mean number of correct touches till an error)
with a G-G 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) x 3 (condition) ANOVA. Grade 8s had longer spans than grade
4s, F(1, 88) = 8.50, p = .004, partial η2 = .09; and span increased as number of designs increased,
F(1.762, 155.081) = 36.72, p < .001, partial η2 = .29. Gifted and mainstream children did not,
however, differ in terms of span score on any of the task conditions, F(1, 88) = 0.70, p = .407,
partial η2 = .01. We examined two other scores derived from the SOPT and found no difference
between gifted and mainstream students in mean number of correct responses, F(1, 88) = 1.31, p
= .256, partial η2 = .02; or median latency for correct responses, F(1, 77) = 2.54, p = .115, partial
η2 = .03. These results could be due, however, to factors other than SOPT performance being
facilitated by perceptual attention. SOPT differs from the n-back both in terms of executive
demand and demand for mental attention (or working memory).
Updating self-ordered pointing task (U-SOPT). We thus modified the SOPT by adding
an updating component that should increase the mental demand of the task, while maintaining its
primary reliance on perceptual attention. We report data for mean span (i.e., mean number of
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correct screens) before an error of any kind. A G-G 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) x 2 (condition)
ANOVA was conducted. Similar to results with the SOPT, grade 8s outperformed grade 4s, F(1,
88) = 21.20, p < .001, partial η2 = .19; and span increased with the number of designs, F(1, 88) =
52.14, p < .001, partial η2 = .37. However, gifted and mainstream children did not differ in terms
of span score in any of the U-SOPT task conditions, F(1, 88) = 1.33, p = .253, partial η2 = .02.
This pattern of results held even when span scores were analyzed separately for ‘new’ and ‘old’
touches. Similarly, there were no effects involving academic stream when data were analyzed in
terms of mean number of correct old or new touches. Thus, consistent with predictions, gifted
children scored higher on the n-back but not on SOPT or U-SOPT.
M-measures. We predicted that gifted students would out-score mainstream peers on
measures of M-capacity. A 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) ANOVA on the FIT M-score yielded main
effects for stream, F(1, 86) = 10.70, p = .002, partial η2 = .11; and grade, F(1, 86) = 34.13, p < .
001, partial η2 = .28. Gifted students scored higher than their mainstream peers, and grade 8s
scored higher than grade 4s. Further, performance levels corresponded closely to theoretically
predicted values (Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2010). That is, grade 4 mainstream children (aged
9-10) obtained mean M-scores close to four, and grade 8 mainstream children (aged 13-14)
obtained mean M-scores close to six. Gifted children, in contrast, scored approximately one level
higher than their mainstream counterparts (i.e., about 5 for grade 4s and about 7 for grade 8s).
A 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) ANOVA run on the Direction Following Task (DFT) M-score
yielded main effects for stream, F(1, 88) = 13.25, p < .001, partial η2 = .13; and grade, F(1, 88) =
20.45, p < .001, partial η2 = .19. Gifted students scored higher than their mainstream peers, and
grade 8s scored higher than grade 4s. Performance level mirrored theoretical prediction for grade
4 mainstream students, but grade 8 mainstream students tended to underperform on the DFT
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relative to FIT and theoretical predictions. Still, gifted students in both grades scored about one
unit higher than their mainstream peers.
Shifting measure. The Contingency Naming Task (CNT) efficiency score conjointly
reflects speed and accuracy. A G-G 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) x 4 (condition) ANOVA yielded main
effects for condition, F(2.26, 198.92) = 515.94, p < .001, partial η2 = .85; grade, F(1, 88) =
66.97, p < .001, partial η2 = .43; and stream, F(1, 88) = 10.89, p = .001, partial η2 = .11.
Efficiency scores were higher for grade 8s than grade 4s, higher for gifted over mainstream
students, and higher for naming (i.e., trials one and two) than for shifting trials (i.e., trials three
and four). These main effects were conditioned by a Grade x Condition interaction, F(2.26,
198.92) = 8.47, p < .001, partial η2 = .09, indicating a significant difference between grade 8s and
grade 4s at all task levels, although this difference decreased as task difficulty increased. These
effects were further conditioned by a Grade x Stream x Condition interaction, F(2.26, 198.92) =
3.02, p = .045, partial η2 = .03. This interaction suggests a gifted advantage on the shifting trials
but not on simple speed of naming trials; this advantage held only for grade 8 gifted students on
trial four, possibly due to the high M-demand of the two-dimensional shifting task. This gifted
advantage on shifting trials, but not on speeded naming trials, was maintained in separate
analyses of accuracy, F(1, 88) = 23.40, p < .001, partial η2 = .21; and latency, F(1, 82) = 7.58, p =
.007, partial η2 = .09 (although the gifted advantage was found only in grade 8 for latency).
Inhibition measure. Proportion correct target identifications on the antisaccade task was
examined with a 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) ANOVA. It yielded main effects for grade, F(1, 87) =
18.93, p < .001, partial η2 = .18; and stream, F(1, 87) = 7.11, p = .009, partial η2 = .08. Gifted
children were more accurate than mainstream children, and grade 8s were more accurate than
grade 4s. Analysis of median response times demonstrated a main effect for grade, F(1, 87) =
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49.69, p < .001, partial η2 = .36; but not for stream, F(1, 87) = 0.51, p = .479, partial η2 = .01.
Grade 8s responded faster than grade 4s did. In sum, grade 8 students performed better than
grade 4’s on all tasks. As predicted, gifted students scored higher than mainstream on all tasks,
except the two SOPT versions.
Correlations. Because correlations computed across the entire sample would conflate
age and stream differences, making interpretation difficult, we present correlations computed
within stream and with age partialled out (correlations thus reflect individual differences). There
were few significant correlations for the gifted sample. Theoretically, most of the shared variance
between FIT and DFT should be due to age; thus, a low correlation is expected when age
variance is removed. The general absence of correlations between M-scores and other tasks
suggests that rather than relying on an advanced endogenous mental-attentional capacity or
general executive know-how, gifted children may rely on more specialized (task-specific)
executive skills. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that gifted (but not mainstream)
children will have already acquired a sophisticated executive repertoire.
In contrast, there were numerous inter-task correlations in the mainstream sample. The
M-tasks correlated with the 2-back (FIT only), SOPT, U-SOPT, and CNT. Switching efficiency
in the CNT correlated with all other tasks. The antisaccade correlated with 2-back and switching.
This pattern suggests that mainstream children may be relying more on general capacity or
general executive know-how. That is, in line with predictions, the mainstream children, unlike
their gifted peers, may have fewer specific executive schemes that selectively apply in particular
tasks. Instead, mainstream students may rely on general executives and M-capacity, as is
demonstrated by the significant correlation between the average M-capacity score (the mean of
FIT and DFT M-scores) and all other measures.
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Discussion

Consistent with past research (Johnson et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2004; Navarro et al.,
2006; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2010), and as predicted, gifted children demonstrated an
advantage over their mainstream peers on tasks mobilizing primarily mental attention, but not
those involving primarily perceptual attention (even when it was made more complex by adding
an updating component). That is, gifted children scored higher than mainstream peers on the nback WM task, as well as measures of M-capacity, inhibition, and task switching. Gifted children
did not score higher on the SOPT, however, even when it was made more complex by adding an
updating component.
These results suggest why a construal of WM as the significant factor underlying
cognitive giftedness fails to adequately explain the gifted advantage. However, characterizing
giftedness in terms of heightened M-capacity can be similarly problematic. Indeed, performance
on measures of M-capacity is co-determined by an individual’s organismic M-capacity and their
‘executive know-how’ (e.g., problem solving strategies), thereby raising the question of whether
this mental attentional advantage is related to a heightened endogenous M-capacity or a superior
repertoire of executive strategies.
In support of a disparate executive know-how between the educational streams (i.e.,
gifted vs. mainstream), and as predicted, gifted children demonstrated superior performance on
tasks of higher executive demand (i.e., 1-back, 2-back, M-measures, antisaccade, contingency
naming task). This advantage did not appear, however, on tasks of lower executive demand (i.e.,
SOPT, U-SOPT, 0-back, and speeded naming trials of the contingency naming task). In fact, if
the gifted advantage were attributable solely to an advanced organismic M-capacity, superior
performance should be expected across all tasks because mental attention could be recruited in
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support of perceptual attentional resources, thereby boosting gifted performance on the SOPT
and U-SOPT as well. Conversely, and in line with the current results, if the gifted advantage is
attributable to superior executive repertoires, this would provide little advantage on the lower-inexecutive-demand (in relation to the n-back) SOPT and U-SOPT.
As children’s executive know-how is largely influenced by learning, these findings open
an interesting avenue towards educational programs that, equipped with these distinctions, may
provide a means for active academic enrichment applicable to all children. This possibility was
supported by the suggestion that the gifted advantage appears, in M-normal children, to be
related to a superior repertoire of executive schemes, thereby emphasizing learned advantages
and training programs rather than focusing on inherent organismic differences. One potentially
viable educational direction for bridging the performance gap between identified gifted and
mainstream children might involve increasing the exposure to novel problem situations and other
executive-enhancing situations. That is, rather than constructing higher-order, subject-specific
concepts by way of facilitating construction of lower-order requisite knowledge structures,
executive know-how might be better developed by supplying children with suitable problem
situations in which children can explore (with suitable cognitive guidance) the relations and
invariances across situations. Through repeated exposure to this mode of learning, it could be
expected that children develop an enhanced repertoire of executive schemes (e.g., strategies) that
foster increased success in transferring specific knowledge to novel situations or novel
applications (a common requirement within educational assessment). Although this study
provides clear support for these claims, further study is required to strengthen and develop these
possibilities.
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